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Evidence on Oportunidades, a successful anti-poverty program in Mexico, 
has suggested that changes to the current grant structure may induce 
considerable improvements to its effectiveness. Moreover, there are 
proposals addressing the importance of regional, observable and 
unobservable characteristics, regarding its implementation. It is employed 
competitiveness level outcomes to investigate if this social policy has 
heterogeneous performance in different regions of intervention. For this 
purpose, a Difference-in-Difference model is applied to estimate short and 
mid-term impacts on enrolment rates. Results indicate that the general 
competitiveness effect is positive but not robust, given the considerable level 
of aggregation of the data used, whereas if it is distinguised Oportunidades 
treatment by selected competitiveness outcomes, states with highly efficient 
government institutions, middle competitive economic sectors and middle 
inclusive, educated and healthy individuals, present a larger program impact 
on enrolment rates. It is confirmed the significant improvements to program 
effectiveness and the impact of the competitiveness variables when it is 
considered only a sample of older children.  
 
Keywords: Social policy effectiveness, competitiveness outcomes, school 
enrolment rates, regional effects, difference-in-difference (DID) model. 
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La evidencia sobre Oportunidades, un exitoso programa de combate a la 
pobreza en México, sugiere que cambios sobre la estructura actual del 
otorgamiento de becas podrían incrementar la efectividad del mismo. 
Inclusive, existen propuestas acerca de la importancia de características 
observables e inobservables relacionadas con su implementación. En este 
trabajo, se emplean variables que miden el nivel de competitividad para 
investigar si esta política social presenta un desempeño heterogéneo en 
diferentes regiones de intervención. Con este fin, se utiliza un modelo de 
Diferencias-en-Diferencias (DID, por sus siglas en inglés) para estimar 
impactos de corto y mediano plazo sobre las tasas de inscripción escolar, y 
los resultados indican que el efecto del nivel general de competitividad es 
positivo pero no robusto, debido al nivel considerable de agregación de los 
datos utilizados; en cambio, si diferenciamos el tratamiento de 
Oportunidades, a través de indicadores seleccionados de competitividad, 
estados con instituciones de gobierno altamente eficientes, sectores 
económicos de mediana competitividad y sociedades con nivel medio de 
participación, educación y salud, se observa que presentan un mayor impacto 
sobre las tasas de inscripción, como consecuencia del programa. Así mismo, 
se confirma una mejora significativa en la efectividad del programa y el 
impacto de las variables de competitividad, cuando se considera una muestra 
de beneficiarios de mayor rango de edad. 
 
Palabras Clave: efectividad de política social, indicadores de 
competitividad, tasas de inscripción escolar, efectos regionales, modelo de 
diferencias-en-diferencias (DID). 





The Human Development Program Oportunidades
1 is one of the largest anti-
poverty programs in Mexico. It was started by the Government in 1998 (at 
this stage called Progresa
2) in the rural Mexico and was expanded in 2002 to 
cover the urban areas. This Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) tries to 
ameliorate the long-run effects of poverty providing grants to children and 
youth Mexicans, with the main objective to increase investments in human 
capital.  
 
                                                 
1 In what follows, Oportunidades is the program that in general will be refered to and 
Progresa denotes only rural-areas component.  
2 It comes from the Spanish acronym on “Program on Health, Education and Nutrition”. Does the Impact of Oportunidades Program Increases in Highly Competitive…? 
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Several works have confirmed the significant effects of Oportunidades over 
outcomes such as household investment decisions (Gertler, Martinez and 
Rubio-Codina, 2006) school participation (Behrman, Gallardo-García, 
Parker, Todd and Vélez-Grajales, 2010; Parker, Todd and Wolpin, 2006; 
Attanasio, Meghir and Santiago, 2009) migration (Azuara, 2009), 
consumption (Angelucci and De Giorgi, 2009; Angelucci and Attanasio, 
2009). Nevertheless, some authors as Attanasio and Rubio-Codina (2009) 
have suggested that this program has marginal impacts on attendance to 
primary school in rural Mexico, given the considerable child participation in 
lower stages of education even in the absence of this intervention. Thus, is 
argued that a re-allocation of the resources should have to be applied to 
impulse its effectiveness in further levels of education (e.g. secondary 
school). Furthermore, Attanasio, Meghir and Szekely (2003) evaluated if 
potential results of Progresa in some Mexican states can be extrapolated to 
other regions, thereby providing evidence about the importance of 
considering different contexts in the implementation of government 
interventions.  
 
Bearing the above information, the main goal of this paper is analyse if 
differentiating the treatment of Oportunidades by regional levels of 
competitiveness, improves the impact of the program on enrolment rates of 
its beneficiaries in urban areas. It is argued that a more competitive 
environment that guaranties, among others, the sufficient conditions of 
infrastructure such as high quality schools and health clinics, skilled human 
capital, a well-developed and structured labour market, and an efficient 
government provides outstanding conditions for the program to work 
efficiently. In order to investigate the specific mechanism of influence, it is 
selected three sub-indices from a Mexican competitiveness index into the 
following three groups: individuals, enterprises and government institutions. 
The proposal is that the impact of Oportunidades may differ across regions 
depending on the general level of competitiveness, the education of the 
population -representing a measure of how competitive individuals are- the 
economic sectors competitiveness -for the enterprises’ competitiveness- and 
the government efficiency.  
 
The literature about competitiveness is restricted to the analysis about its 
determinants, as in the contributions of Dzeng and Wang (2008) and 
Marginean (2006); and the effects of different outcomes on it, as in Aldy and 
Pizer (2009) and Anger et al. (2007). However, to my knowledge, there is no 
evidence about the competitiveness impact on social policies performance. 
Similarly, evidence on the effects of individuals’ level of education is related 
to human capital spillovers on co-workers earnings and productivity, as it is 
pointed out in Battu, Belfield and Sloane (2003) and Navon (2009), and 
Ramos, Suriñach and Artis (2009). The famous studies of Hall and Jones Ensayos Revista de Economía 
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(1999) consider the effects of institutions and Acemoglu, Robinson and 
Johnson (2001) refers to the impact on economic performance. To the best of 
my knowledge, the paper of Attanasio et al. (2003) and schooling supply-
side studies of Coady and Parker (2002) and Berhman, Parker and Todd 
(2005) are the only ones addressing a similar topic. Thus, there is no social 
policy-oriented research about the impact of competitiveness outcomes. 
Consequently, the present paper is the first in evaluating a social program in 
this context. 
 
The rest of the paper is developed as follows. In the next section it is 
provided a brief description of the program under study and the dataset used 
in the estimation. After that, it is explained the main findings about 
Oportunidades impact and the contribution to the literature. In section 3, it is 
introduced the model to be applied and the parameters of interest, followed 
by section 4 where it is presented the results of the estimation. Finally, it is 
provided a conclusions section that summarises the most important results 
and make recommendations for further research on the topic. 
 
 
1. Oportunidades Background and Dataset 
 
In general, the aim of the program is to benefit poor households conditional 
on investment in three fundamental factors: education, health and nutrition. 
Specifically, the transference works as a grant conditional on behaviour such 
as children and adolescents attending school, infants receiving micronutrient 
supplements, mothers attending sessions on nutrition and health practices, 
and all family members having regular health and nutrition checkups 
(Behrman, 2007). Like traditional CCT, the cash is directly transferred to 
mothers in the household, considering that women might be more worried 
about children’s well being.  
 
Originally, Progresa provided grants to children between the third and ninth 
grades of school (the second half of primary school and complete years of 
lower-secondary school
3). When the latter expanded its influence to urban 
locations (called then Oportunidades) the support started to include from the 
tenth to twelfth levels of education (upper-secondary school). Finally, it is 
valuable to mention that the amounts transferred to beneficiaries increase 
with the grades reached and that are higher for girls since the seventh grade, 
whom traditionally have lower levels of school enrolment at this stage. 
 
                                                 
3 In the present work primary, lower-secondary and upper-secondary school levels 
correspond to primaria,  secundaria and preparatoria in the Mexican school system, 
respectively. Does the Impact of Oportunidades Program Increases in Highly Competitive…? 
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The source of the data are the Urban Household Evaluations 
(“ENCELURB”, for the abbreviation in Spanish) of 2002 (Baseline survey) 
2003 (First follow-up survey) and 2004 (Second follow-up survey). The 
ENCELURB was launched by the Ministry of Social Development in 
coordination with the National Institute of Public Health and the advice of 
international researchers for the technical and methodological aspects.  
 
The ENCELURB differs from its rural counterpart due to financial 
constraints, and as a result, a non-randomized, observational and quasi-
experimental design was launched. This survey used information from the 
National Income and Expenditure of Households Survey 2000 (ENIGH, 
from its Spanish original name) and the 2000 Population Census, allowing 
the Program executors targeting the families directly on the poorest city 
block and then classifying them as eligible (poor) and non-eligible (non 
poor). The next step was installing near sign-up offices in the selected 
intervention areas (starting in 2002) for potential beneficiaries that consider 
themselves as eligible,
4 whereas the households in the non-intervention 
zones where considered to start in 2004. On the other hand, the rural 
evaluation was a controlled randomized experiment design where 
households were informed directly about their status of eligibility. Therefore, 
a considerable number of urban eligible families
5 did not request their 
incorporation into the program, while the mechanism in the rural areas 
achieved high rates of participation. 
 
The ENCELURB collected information of 76,002 individuals in 2002. From 
this sample it was selected a total of 29,363 children between 6 and 20 years, 
from which 19,360 live in intervention areas and 10,003 in control ones. 
After that, the attention is focused on eligible people in both areas 
accounting for 20,602 poor children. Finally, after cleansing the data of 
inconsistent ages and years of schooling the sample was 16,642 persons, 
divided by 10,181 and 6,461 children of intervention and control areas, 
respectively. 
 
Most of the sample corresponds to children between the first and twelfth 
grades of school. Although children 6-7 years of age (first and second grades 
of school) are not directly supported by the program, but they are included 
on the sample because they may be incentivised to enrol at school and as a 
result, become beneficiaries in the third grade.  
 
Table 1 has some main baseline data characteristics (year 2002) of the final 
sample. It is evident that children living in intervention areas are relatively 
                                                 
4 Households noticed the existence of the program through a promotion campaign in the 
media. 
5 Around 40% according to Behrman et al. (2010). Ensayos Revista de Economía 
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older, but for the rest of the variables the group of comparison has higher 
enrolment rates and more educated parents. It is included the head of the 
family’s education as an alternative indicator for parents’ level of schooling, 
given data availability and that on average, it is a good approximation for 
mother and father’s grades of schooling. Table 1 also shows that the mean 
differences between all the variables are significant at the 1% level. 
 
Table 1 




Comparision  Intervention  Control 
Mean  Std. Dev. Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Difference 
Age  11.40  3.77  11.17  3.77  0.23*** 
Years of 
schooling  4.25  2.90  4.40  2.86  -0.15*** 
Enrolment  0.83  0.37  0.86  0.34  -0.03*** 
Mother’s years 
of schooling  5.22  2.71  5.54  2.78  -0.32*** 
Father’s years 
of schooling  5.51  2.96  6.01  2.93  -0.50*** 
Head of family’s 
years of 
schooling 
5.36  2.93  5.75  2.94  -0.39*** 
Note: Both groups correspond to the intervention and control areas specifically selected by 
policy executors, according to their targeting method. 
***Significant at the 1% level. 
Source: Own calculations with data from the ENCELURB, www.oportunidades.gob.mx. 
 
Figure 1 also shows that the intervention and control areas have important 
pre-program differences in years of schooling. For both groups the years of 
education increase almost linearly with age until children reach 15 years old 
(lower-secondary school level), and then, the lines become flatter and remain 
constant on 8 years of schooling. It is noticeable that on average, 
intervention and control groups follow the same tendency. Consistent to 
Behrman et al. (2010) educational attainment has the same pattern by sex, 
where girls years of schooling are always higher in the control group than in 
the intervention one, whereas for boys is the same case until 15 years old and 











Source: Own elaboration with data from the ENCELURB, www.oportunidades.gob.mx. 
 
With respect to the enrolment rates, Figure 2 depicts its evolution for the 
groups of interest. The enrolment rates are higher for the control group up to 
16 years old, then the levels are roughly the same for the next two years, and 
at the end, the intervention group shows higher attendance rates for the last 
years. Moreover, the percentage of child/youth enrolled in the 2001-2002 
period is more than 90 percent during primary school (until 12 years old) and 
after that, falls dramatically, achieving around 14 and nearly 9 percentage 
points for the intervention and control groups, respectively. In this regard, it 
is not surprising that the policymakers started the program providing grants 
for primary and lower-secondary school levels, in order to help its 





























































Source: Own elaboration with data from the ENCELURB, www.oportunidades.gob.mx. 
 
In the next sub-section it is described the source of the data that is used to 
measure regional competitiveness 
 
1.2. The Competitiveness Index 
 
The State Competitiveness Index 2006 (SCI2006) was launched by the 
Mexican Institute for Competitiveness (IMCO from its initials in Spanish) 
providing information about the economy, institutions, politics, social 
aspects and other topics as means to support policy-making and investment 
decisions.
6 Table 2 shows the SCI2006 ranking for 17 states; states where 
the ENCELURB provides information are shown in bold format. 
Unfortunately, data about the states with highest levels of competitiveness 
and the state with the lowest one (Oaxaca) are missing, which in case of 
availability would help out. 
 
This index could be appropriate for these purposes because its data 
corresponds to the year 2003, which is in fact the first year of Oportunidades 
(school year 2002-2003) implementation in urban areas, thereby providing 





                                                 































State Competitiveness Index 2006* 
 
Position  State name  Position  State name 
1  Distrito Federal     17  Durango 
2  Nuevo Leon    18  Yucatan 
3  Aguascalientes     19  Campeche 
4  Baja California     20  Sinaloa 
5  Coahuila     21  Nayarit 
6  Chihuahua     22  Edo Mexico 
7  Baja California Sur     23  San Luis Potosi 
8  Quintana Roo     24  Puebla 
9  Tamaulipas     25  Tlaxcala 
10  Queretaro     26  Michoacan 
11  Colima     27  Veracruz 
12  Sonora     28  Guerrero 
13  Guanajuato     29  Hidalgo 
14  Morelos     30  Tabasco 
15  Jalisco     31  Chiapas 
16  Zacatecas     32  Oaxaca 
* The index uses data from 2003. 
Source: IMCO (2006).   
 
SCI2006 was constructed with several indicators classified into 10 
categories
7 (see Table 3). From these sub-indices, it is hypothesised that the 
following factors would affect positively the performance of Oportunidades: 
inclusive, educated and healthy society (individuals) efficient and efficacious 
government (government) and competitive economic sectors (enterprises). It 
is calculated the impact of the latter indices, in order to find a deeper 
understanding of the mechanism through which different levels of 












                                                 
7 For more details about the construction of the SCI2006, please refer to 







Trustworthy and objective law system  
Sustainable Environmental Management 
Inclusive, educated and healthy society 
Stable and dynamic economy 
Stable and functional political system 
Efficient market of factors 
World class sectors 
Efficient and efficacious government 
Exploitation of international relations 
Competitive economic sectors 
Source: IMCO (2006). 
 
The next chapter presents the main evidence about Oportunidades impact on 
schooling outcomes and some other relevant studies related with the 
approach proposed in this study.  
 
 
2. Empirical Evidence on Oportunidades Evaluation 
 
After the 1995’s crisis the Mexican Government policy design was 
concentrated to counteract the possible effects over vulnerable groups. 
Regarding this issue, Oportunidades emerged as a mechanism to break the 
cycle of intergenerational poverty. In this matter, it is expected that this 
effort to alleviate the effects of poverty should have to be accompanied by a 
high quality evaluation to assess its effectiveness. In this section, it is 
reviewed relevant empirical evidence regarding this policy and discuss 
issues that have arisen in spite of increase Oportunidades performance.  
 
Behrman et al. (2010) evaluates the short term impact of the Oportunidades 
on schooling and work behaviours of children, finding significant positive 
impacts on educational attainment, school enrolment, proportions working, 
and amount of time children spend doing homework. They find larger effects 
for the 15-18 and 19-20 age group, whereas smaller impacts were found for 
younger children. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that this article reports 
greater effects for children 6-7, a group of age that is not directly supported 
by Oportunidades; in comparison to the closest older group. 
 
Parker  et al. (2006) explored the use of dynamic panel data schooling 
models as a means to evaluate the short-term and longer-run effects of 
Oportunidades on schooling outcomes. They implemented “kinship-based” 
estimators exploiting within-family variation in the timing of the program Does the Impact of Oportunidades Program Increases in Highly Competitive…? 
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with respect to children’s ages. Their hypothesis was that older siblings’ 
school performance would have an effect over younger siblings’ outcomes. 
After their estimations those researchers found that the program has 
significant effects on school attendance for older girls and boys. With respect 
to the simulation of the long-term program effects they estimate that a child 
participating in the program from age 6-17 would complete about 0.5 
additional years of schooling. Bearing these findings, achieving more years 
of education increases the probability to be employed in a higher-quality job 
and earn greater wages. However, it cannot be concluded anything about an 
enhancement in the skills of participant child/youth, which in fact can lead to 
higher returns to education when these individuals enter to the labour force.  
 
In line with the last argument, Behrman, Parker and Todd (2005) took the 
advantage of a follow-up evaluation survey (5 years after the first survey) 
carried out in rural areas and assessed the effect of Progresa  on several 
outcomes in the long-run. As a part of this second survey round, 
achievement tests in the areas of reading, math and written language skills 
were applied to a sub-sample of adolescents 15 to 21 years of age in 2003. 
Although, this paper showed significant effects for greater program 
exposure, it also indicated that there are insignificant results on test scores, 
possibly explained by the low quality of schools in rural areas. It could be 
interesting to investigate this issue in urban areas given the higher levels of 
investment on school infrastructure and teaching quality (relative to rural 
ones). 
 
School attendance rates are nearly one hundred percent on the first years of 
education at the baseline year (see Figure 2) which explains the marginal 
effects in these levels and have lead to proposals about changes in the grant 
structure of Oportunidades. For example, De Janvry and Sadoulet (2005) 
have proposed re-direct all resources associated to the primary school 
transfer to children in the transition from primary to secondary school. 
Furthermore, Attanasio et al. (2008) simulated the possibility of abolishing 
or decreasing the primary school grant in order to increase the transfers for 
the levels of lower-secondary and upper-secondary school, finding important 
improvements to the overall program performance.  
 
Nevertheless, it should have been considered the opportunity cost of 
decreasing or eliminating the primary cash transfer. In this matter, Attanasio 
and Rubio-Codina (2009) isolated the impact of the primary school stipend 
to check for possible externalities over households’ outcomes like child 
health, household consumption and secondary school enrolment, finding that 
the program impacts are not substantially different between eligible 
households in treatment areas and non-eligible ones.  
 Ensayos Revista de Economía 
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The above papers suggested changes in the grant structure, considering the 
level of education of the beneficiaries. Nonetheless, there are additional 
aspects to take into account when is attempted to introduce a program in a 
given geographical area. Attanasio et al. (2003) assessed the importance of 
considering individuals’ differences in observable and unobservable 
characteristics, as well as institutional differences between regions; when 
policy makers are trying to replicate a successful program experience in a 
new place. For example, they stressed the importance of taking into account 
if a region has more educated people, differences in infrastructure and laws 
about child labour, which are relevant factors for this approach. To address 
the mentioned topic, these researchers splited the Mexican states included in 
Progresa’s evaluation into two groups, with the objective of study if 
achievements in slightly more dynamic states can be extrapolated to other 
regions. After their simulations, they estimate a lower impact on the poorest 
states, meaning that it is important to implement additional policy 
interventions in order to improve its effectiveness in less developed areas. 
 
In the following subsection it is discussed the mechanism through which 
competitiveness outcomes do influence the differential exposure of 
Oportunidades’ treatment. 
 
2.1 The Influence of Competitiveness: Main Assumptions 
 
As it was previously mentioned, Oportunidades has been extensively 
analyzed in previous studies, revealing that the program is an effective 
mechanism to accumulate human capital on poor individuals. Almost all 
Latin American countries and others in the developing world (e.g. African 
and Asian nations and Turkey) have similar interventions. It is worth noting 
that CCT have spread to developed areas as the program Opportunity NYC 
in New York City, which is inspired in Oportunidades. Early findings 
showed that Opportunity NYC has significant short-term impacts on poverty 
reduction, children’s educational outcomes, family member’s health care and 
parents’ work and training (Riccio, 2010). Even tough there is no evidence 
about the effects of competitiveness on CCT effectiveness, the latter result is 
particularly relevant because indicates that this type of programs have 
success on regions with outstanding competitiveness conditions. As a matter 
of fact, New York City is ranked 1
st all over the world in the “2009-2010 
Global Urban Competitiveness Report.” 
 
For this analysis, it is hypothesised that parents and/or children might be 
more responsive to the program rewards, because they may perceive that the 
current and future benefits from participating are higher in a more 
competitive environment. For example, in highly competitive regions the 
stock of health infrastructure and human resources might have better quality Does the Impact of Oportunidades Program Increases in Highly Competitive…? 
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and, as a result, the families are more incentivised to participate because the 
health assistance is also enhanced. Moreover, the expected returns to 
schooling are higher in the presence of school quality inputs. Behrman et al. 
(2005) found that the impact of Oportunidades on enrolment rates increases 
with schooling quality in rural areas, measured by pupil-teacher ratios and 
the type of secondary school attended. In this study, it is also suggested that 
a more dynamic, productive and well structured labour market, accompanied 
by highly competitive enterprises, are competitiveness characteristics that 
positively complement the latter mechanism of program impact 
enhancement. 
 
It is also proposed that the impact of Oportunidades is higher in states with 
more educated people and a dynamic economy. For instance, Attanasio et al. 
(2003) confirmed that this is true in the rural areas where enrolment rates, 
wages and household income are relatively higher. Furthermore, it is argued 
that a more participative government with a trustworthy and objective law 
system do influence households to take the advantage of a government 
intervention such as Oportunidades, due to minimized transaction costs. 
Additionally, a tight collaboration between all government levels (national, 
state and local) is beneficial for this social program, because additional 
policies are necessary to satisfy the increased demand, like the provision of 
more teachers, nurses and physicians. 
 
In general, the mentioned aspects are incorporated in a competitive 
environment which offers integral acceptable conditions, maximizing 
individuals’ socioeconomic potential, while constantly fostering their well-
being, allowing them to face economic fluctuations (IMCO, 2006) thereby 
increasing the probability of anti-poverty programs success. 
 
The next section presents the basic framework and the methodology to 
estimate a difference in difference model. 
 
 
3. Econometric Approach 
 
The general methodological approach compares the outcomes of individuals 
supported by Oportunidades (treatment group) with a group of people which 
meet the program’s eligibility criteria but do not participate on it (control 
group). Specifically, it is considered the following groups: 
 
 Treatment group. - Individuals living in intervention areas that meet the 
eligibility criteria choose to participate and were accepted on it. Ensayos Revista de Economía 
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 Control group. - 1) Individuals that live in intervention areas, meet the 
eligibility criteria but did not choose to participate on it; 2) Individuals that 
live in non- intervention areas but are eligible given their characteristics. 
 
As it was mentioned in the program description, persons living in 
intervention areas were selected to start in 2002, whereas the ones living in 
non-intervention areas will be incorporated in the year 2004. On the other 
hand, enrolment rates and ages of treatment and control groups are on 
average the same but differ only on the years of schooling and parents’ 









Comparision  Treatment  Control 
Mean  Std. Dev. Mean  Std. Dev. Difference 
Age  11.30  3.68  11.32  3.82  -0.02 
Years of 
schooling  4.14  2.83  4.41  2.91       -0.27*** 
Enrolment  0.84  0.36  0.84  0.36   0.00 
Mother’s years 
of schooling  5.22  2.73  5.36  2.72      -0.14** 
Father’s years 




5.31  2.89  5.64  2.97      -0.33*** 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
Source: Own calculations with data from the ENCELURB, www.oportunidades.gob.mx. 
 
The parameter of interest is the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
(ATT) “…that is the effect of the program on those who receive it, in that 
they are not only eligible and live in treatment areas, but actually participate 
into the program” (Attanasio et al. 2008). In this sense, it is found that the 
ATT appropriate because it includes eligible non-participant households in 
the control group that live in intervention areas, thereby allowing to 
differentiate them form the ones that decided to participate. 
 
                                                 
8 A more sophisticated method, propensity score matching estimation will be used to 
verify the results.  Does the Impact of Oportunidades Program Increases in Highly Competitive…? 
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Attanasio et al. (2008) suggested that more sophisticated results could be 
found with the Average Intention to Treat (AIT) “...which measures the 
average impact of the program on eligible individuals, regardless of whether 
they participate in the program.” Nonetheless, the rate of participation in 
intervention areas is relatively low (slightly more than 50%). Angelucci and 
Attanasio (2009) carry out with the identification of AIT and ATT to explore 
the determinants of program participation to study the effect of 
Oportunidades  on food and non-food consumption. Their estimations 
showed that the ATT effects were positive and significant for the period 
analyzed, whereas the AIT provided smaller coefficients but not statistically 
significant. Regarding the latter evidence, the study will focus on the ATT as 
a way to identify the impact of Oportunidades on enrolment.  
 
Compared with the application of Attanasio et al. (2003) the proposed 
estimation differs in the main objective because the intention is not to 
extrapolate or “scale up” regional effects, and also, in the data structure, 
given that they had access to a randomized evaluation sample for the rural 
Progresa. However, as a part of their analysis, those researchers 
implemented a difference-in-difference model to estimate separately the 
effect on enrolment rates of their two groups of interest, which is comparable 
with the approach that is carried out. 
 
In the next sub-section, it is formally introduced a conventional difference-
in-difference model. 
 
3.1 A Difference-in-Difference (DID) Model 
 
Following a standard DID approach, let      be the outcome for an individual 
  at time  =0, 1. Define      1  if   is treated and      0  if is not exposed to 
the program (control group). Let also    be a set of covariates. The ATT is 
then: 
 
             1        0 |  ,      1    (1) 
 
It is observed that         1 |  ,      1  , but the counterfactual outcome 
       0 |  ,      1   is missing. In order to tackle with this methodological 
issue, DID models assume that in the absence of treatment, average 
outcomes for treated and control groups would follow parallel paths (see 
Figure 3) over time (Abadie, 2005).  
 
Getting in the context of this application, it is important to evaluate if it is 
valid to assume that schooling outcomes of individuals, living in a region 
with a given level of competitiveness, would follow the same trends without 
being treated. This assumption is satisfied, because individual schooling Ensayos Revista de Economía 
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decisions take place in similar competitiveness environments. For example, 
it is plausible that they have access to similar quality of schooling and health 





Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Therefore, the parameter of interest can be approximated with the next 
expression: 
 
              1 |  ,      1           0 |  ,      0      
(2)                     1 |  ,      1           0 |  ,      0    
 
The basic panel data equation to be estimated is the following: 
 
                                  (3) 
 
where   is the effect of time on all units,   is the ATT and                . 
Nevertheless, Meyer (1995) explains that the effect of the treatment may 
differ across regions (interaction of setting and treatment). In this regard, it is 
argued that there are heterogeneous effects due to different competitiveness 
outcomes between the regions in which the program is being applied. Thus, 
the type of equation to be estimated becomes: 
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where   is the coefficient of interest denoting the impact of the interaction 
term. With the above formula, it is attempted to differentiate the effect that 
has the treatment on states with higher levels of competitiveness as a general 
approach, and highly inclusive, educated and healthy society, competitive 
economic sectors and efficient government institutions, as particular 
outcomes.  
 
It is argued that if individuals in a given region are more educated; there are 
important economic incentives to poor people to pursue higher levels of 
education in order to compete in the labour market. As a consequence, in 
those states is more reasonable to think that individuals would take the 
advantage of being granted by the program and will attend school. 
Furthermore, it is believed that states with more competitive economic 
sectors (or enterprises) would require high skilled individuals in order to 
maintain their productivity level; as a consequence, the labour force has to 
meet these requirements in order to acquire a job. Finally, it is considered 
that if the government institutions works efficiently, the infrastructure and 
the environment would be more adequate to have a higher program 
performance. 
 
Following Attanasio et al. (2003) it is supposed that in each period children 
(or their parents) take the decision of whether attend school or work, 
considering all present and future benefits and costs that can affect their 
expected utilities. Moreover, studying and working are the only two options 
that a child can undertake. Given the relative higher levels of education in 
urban areas, it is assumed that children can study up to age 20. If they choose 
to work, they will receive a local wage according to their education and age.  
 
Regarding the “Basic Model” of Parker et al. (2006) it is assumed that 
child’s schooling decisions depend on family-specific “unobservable” 
variables (time invariant). For instance, the  variables that determine the 
decision of whether or not send children to school are child’s age and sex, 
the lagged attendance and the head of family’s education. The latter 
variables are not specifically variables of interest, but controls to isolate the 
effect of the competitiveness variables. 
 






In this segment, it is presented the estimations of the ATT effect of 
Oportunidades on enrolment rates. It is attempted to differentiate the effect Ensayos Revista de Economía 
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of the treatment by levels of general competitiveness and selected 
competitiveness outcomes. It is used a difference-in-difference (DID) model 
to calculate the first (short-term impact) and second
9 (mid-term impact) 
years impacts of Oportunidades implementation. Like in Behrman et al. 
(2010) it is computed the bootstrap standard errors to have an accurate 
estimation of the DID model. 
 
First at all, it is estimated a general model specification for the whole sample 
(children 6-20 years of age). After that, it is adjusted the sample design to 
estimate the effect on enrolment rates for older children (children 10-20 
years of age) to examine if the impact is higher. 
 
4.1 Competitiveness Level 
 
Table 1 reports the estimated program impacts on schooling enrolment. 
Columns 1 and 2 show a simple Cross Section Model for the first year of 
program implementation (2003) and OLS estimation for the whole panel 
data period (2002-2004) respectively. Finally, columns 3-7 cover the first 
year calculations using the Difference-in-Difference (DID) model.
10 
 
Column 3 reveals that Oportunidades roughly increases enrolment rates by 
3.1 percentage points. For the same range of age, the baseline result is 
equivalent to the simple DID result in Behrman et al. (2010) for boys, but is 
less than the 3.6% estimated for girls. Similarly, this result is slightly smaller 
than the 3.5% of the basic model in Parker et al. (2006) but they considered 
children between 6-17 years and included ineligible households in their 
sample.  
 
On the other hand, the control variables are strongly correlated with the 
schooling outcome obtained in this study. For instance, ceteris paribus, if 
children’s age increases, it is more likely that he/she may drop out from 
school. Also, if the child/youth is a boy, the chances that he enrols to school 
decrease. If the child has attended school in the previous year, there is a 
higher probability that he/she enrols in the present period. All those variables 
are statistically significant in all the DID models.  
 
According to the first result on column 4 if the beneficiary of Oportunidades 
lives in a highly competitive state, the enrolment increases by 2.7 percentage 
points. Even though the latter result is marginally significant, after adding 
the rest of the covariates, this coefficient loses its prediction power.  
 
 
                                                 
9 The tables of second year estimations  are available on request. 




Estimated program effect on enrolment 
Child/Youth 6-20 years 
Competitiveness Index 
 





OLS   1 Year DID 
         (1)        (2)       (3)      (4)     (5)     (6)    (7) 
Treated    0.019***   0.024***   0.031***   0.031***   0.027***   0.027***   0.028*** 
   (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
  
Highly 
Competitive   -0.018  -0.024***  …  -0.033***  -0.049***  -0.049***  -0.034*** 
States Dummy   (0.011)  (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.010) 
  
Middle 
Competitive   -0.028***  -0.02***  …  -0.005  -0.028***  -0.028***  -0.034*** 
States Dummy   (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
  
Treatment on 
Highly  -0.017  -0.011  …   0.027*   0.015   0.015   0.002 
Competitive 
States  (0.017)  (0.01)    (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.014) 
  
Treatment on 
Middle    0.000   0.000  …   0.008   0.013   0.013  0.012 
Competitive 
States  (0.013)  (0.008)    (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.012) 
  
Age  -0.035***  -0.039***  …  …  -0.050***  -0.050***  -0.046*** 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
  
Sex  -0.003  -0.007***  …  …  …  -0.007**  -0.010** 




Education    0.005***   0.006***  …  …  …  …   0.010*** 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
  
Lagged 
Attendance   0.445***   0.390***  …  …  …  …  … 
   (0.013)  (0.015) 
  
Constant   0.880***   0.963***  …  …  …  …  … 
   (0.022)  (0.019)    
  
Number of 
Observations  10,279  19,770    29,226  29,226  29,226  29,226  23,115 
R
2  0.4596   0.5213     0.0010  0.0014  0.2464   0.2465  0.2365 
Note: The dummy and treatment variables are correlated by construction, however, to show the general effect of living in each 
region and being treated separately.  
Bootstrap Standard Errors in Parentheses, 500 replications.  
*** Significant at the 1% level  . 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
Source: Own elaboration with data from the ENCELURB, www.oportunidades.gob.mx. 
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Similarly, the treatment on middle competitive states shows the predicted 
sign and a lower magnitude than the high one but is not statistically 
significant. Despite that, it is interesting to notice that there is a negative and 
significant effect of living in a state with high or middle competitiveness 
level (highly and middle competitive state dummies) perhaps capturing the 
influence of the control group which is not being directly incentivised by the 
program to attend school. Furthermore, the selected-poor individuals in the 
ENCELURB have similar observable characteristics; so that it is pointed out 
that the effect of the competitiveness outcomes is reflected in the presence of 
the program, because households might take the advantage of it, perhaps 
considering (among others) that the expected returns to school are higher in a 
more competitive environment.   
 
The mid-term program impacts increase in magnitude.
11 For instance, after 2 
years of implementation Oportunidades raises enrolment by 3.5 percentage 
points. It is interesting to notice that Behrman et al. (2010) did not find a 
significant effect for the second year impact on enrolment rates. Regarding 
the treatment on highly competitive states, it is found a positive and higher 
coefficient than in the first year (3.4%) being only marginally significant in 
the very first estimations. Nonetheless, the result becomes insignificant after 
including control variables. 
 
4.2 Inclusive, Educated and Healthy Society (IEHS) 
 
The results in Table 2 reveal that apparently there is not an increase in the 
Oportunidades program impact if the region has a highly inclusive, educated 
and healthy society (IEHS). More surprisingly is the fact that when the 
Mexican states have just middle developed individuals in this outcome, there 
is an increase of 5.2 percentage points in enrolment in the first year (see 
column 4) and 5.8 percentage points in the second year. These results double 
the OLS estimations and remain significant even after including the controls. 
 
Those findings might suggest that in states with highly educated individuals, 
there are fewer incentives to poor people to pursuit higher levels of 
education, taking into account their relative disadvantage with respect to 








                                                 




Estimated program effect on enrolment  
Child/Youth 6-20 years  
Sub-Index: Inclusive, Educated and Healthy Society (IEHS) 
 
   Estimator 
Variable  Cross-Section 
Post Program    OLS   1 Year DID 
     (1)      (2)       (3)     (4)      (5)     (6)    (7) 
Treated   0.015**   0.017***    0.031***   0.031***   0.027***   0.027***   0.028*** 
   (0.007)  (0.005)   (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
   
Highly IEHS  -0.028***  -0.025***  …   0.006  -0.025***  -0.025***  -0.028*** 
States Dummy   (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
  
Middle IEHS  -0.019**  -0.025***  …  -0.007  -0.034***  -0.034***  -0.036*** 
States Dummy   (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
  
Treatment on 
Highly   -0.001   0.000  …  -0.001   0.005   0.005   0.008 
IEHS States  (0.011)  (0.007)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.010) 
  
Treatment on 
Middle    0.018   0.023***  …   0.052***   0.052***   0.052***   0.043*** 
IEHS States  (0.014)  (0.009)  (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
  
Age  -0.035***  -0.039***  …  …  -0.050***  -0.050***  -0.046*** 
   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
  
Sex  -0.003  -0.007***  …  …  …  -0.007**  -0.011** 




Education   0.005***   0.006***  …  …  …  …   0.010*** 
   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
  
Lagged 
Attendance   0.446***   0.390***  …  …  …  …  … 
   (0.013)  (0.014) 
  
Constant   0.881***   0.969***  …  …  …  …  … 
   (0.023)  (0.018)    
Number of 
Observations  10,279  19,770  29,226  29,226  29,226  29,226  23,115 
R
2  0.4592  0.5212  0.0010  0.0016  0.2458  0.2459  0.2360 
Note: The dummy and treatment variables are correlated by construction, however, to show the general effect of living in each 
region and being treated separately.  
Bootstrap Standard Errors in Parentheses, 500 replications. 
*** Significant at the 1% level.  
** Significant at the 5% level.  
* Significant at the 10% level.  
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4.3 Competitive Economic Sectors (CES) 
 
Table 3 reveals a parallel result to the one earlier reviewed. If a child/youth 
is supported in a state with middle CES, the enrolment raises by 3.3 
percentage points, two times the OLS coefficient. Similarly, there is no gain 
in program´s effectiveness if it is implemented in a highly CES state. Once 
again, if it is considered intervention and control areas as a whole, there is a 
negative effect on enrolment rates of living in a state with highly/middle 
CES, thereby reflecting the interaction with the no treated. 
 
The second year DID estimations confirm the above result for the states with 
middle CES. However, the impact decreases this time to 2.6 percentages 
points, but is still a statistically significant coefficient. These finding may be 
a consequence of the high human capital requirements in states with highly 
CES, reducing poor people incentives, making them decide not to attend 
further levels of schooling, given their relatively higher investment costs and 
the reduced chances to succeed in the future. 
 
4.4 Efficient and Efficacious Government (EEG) 
 
According to the calculations presented in this study, if Oportunidades is 
launched in a Mexican state with a highly EEG, the program impact 
increases by 3.8 percentage points. This result remains strongly significant 
although it was added other covariates. In this case, the coefficient of the 
middle EEF is positive and lower than the high one as it would be expected, 
but it is not statistically significant. Nevertheless, OLS results in column 2 
(see Table 4) predict a significant effect of the high and middle EEG 
treatment effects, being the middle coefficient lower than the high one. 
 
Again, a mid-term exposure to the program has an important spillover effect 
of having more efficient government institutions. For instance, ceteris 
paribus, if a child is supported in a state with a highly EEG, the enrolment 
rate rises by 3.9 percentage points. This coefficient falls to 2.7 percentage 
points when it was added all the control variables, but remains significant 
though. 
 
There are proposals about the significant gains in effectiveness when it is 
considered the effect only on older children. Next sub-section will present 
estimations for slightly older children in order to figure out if the effect of 









Estimated program effect on enrolment 
Child/Youth 6-20 years  
Sub-Index: Competitive Economic Sectors (CES) 
 





OLS   1 Year DID 
        (1)       (2)      (3)      (4)      (5)     (6)      (7) 
Treated    0.010    0.021***    0.031***    0.031***    0.027***    0.027***    0.028*** 
(0.009)  (0.005)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
  
Highly CES  -0.025***  -0.018***  …  -0.010  -0.028***  -0.028***  -0.028*** 
States Dummy   (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
  
Middle CES  -0.014*  -0.010**  …  -0.040***  -0.039***  -0.039***  -0.038*** 
States Dummy   (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
  
Treatment on 
Highly    0.005  -0.004  …    0.007    0.003    0.003    0.005 
CES States  (0.012)  (0.007)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
  
Treatment on 
Middle     0.030**    0.017**  …    0.033***    0.033***    0.033***    0.034*** 
CES States  (0.012)  (0.007)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.010) 
  
Age  -0.035***  -0.039***  …  …  -0.050***  -0.050***  -0.046*** 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
  
Sex  -0.003  -0.007***  …  …  …  -0.007*  -0.010*** 




Education    0.005***    0.006***  …  …  …  …    0.010*** 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
  
Lagged 
Attendance    0.446***    0.391***  …  …  …  …  … 
(0.012)  (0.015) 
  
Constant    0.877***    0.960***  …  …  …  …  … 
(0.021)  (0.020)    
  
Number of 
Observations  10,279  19,770  29,226  29,226  29,226  29,226  23,115 
R
2  0.4592  0.5210  0.0010  0.0022  0.2461  0.2462  0.2352 
Note: The dummy and treatment variables are correlated by construction, however, to show the general effect of living in each 
region and being treated separately.  
Bootstrap Standard Errors in Parentheses, 500 replications. 
*** Significant at the 1% level.  
** Significant at the 5% level. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 










Estimated program effect on enrolment  
Child/Youth 6-20 years  
Sub-Index: Efficient and Eficacious Government (EEG) 
 






   OLS   1 Year DID 
        (1)       (2)     (3)      (4)      (5)     (6)     (7) 
Treated   0.006   0.012**   0.031***   0.031***   0.027***   0.027***   0.028*** 
   (0.010)  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
   
Highly EEG  -0.021**  -0.013***  …  -0.037***  -0.033***  -0.033***  -0.028*** 
States Dummy   (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
  
Middle EEG  -0.016**  -0.014***  …  -0.001  -0.017***  -0.017***  -0.016** 
States Dummy   (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
  
Treatment on 
Highly   0.035***    0.026***  …   0.038***   0.031***    0.030***   0.031*** 
EEG States  (0.013)  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.011) 
  
Treatment on 
Middle    0.019   0.021***  …   0.007    0.010   0.010   0.013 
EEG States  (0.013)  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.011) 
  
Age  -0.035***  -0.039***  …  …  -0.050***  -0.050***  -0.045*** 
   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
  
Sex  -0.003  -0.007**  …  …  …  -0.007*  -0.010*** 




Education    0.005***    0.006***  …  …  …  …   0.010*** 
   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
  
Lagged 
Attendance   0.446***   0.391***  …  …  …  …  … 
   (0.013)  (0.016) 
  
Constant   0.876***   0.959***  …  …  …  …  … 
   (0.021)  (0.020) 
  
Number of 
Observations  10,279  19,770  29,226  29,226  29,226  29,226  23,115 
R
2  0.4584  0.5207  0.0010  0.0023  0.2454  0.2455  0.2353 
Note: The dummy and treatment variables are correlated by construction, however, to show the general effect of living in each 
region and being treated separately.  
Bootstrap Standard Errors in Parentheses, 500 replications. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
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4.5 The Effects on Older Children 
 
Given the marginal effects on younger children that have been previously 
discussed in Behrman et al. (2010) de Janvry and Sadoulet (2005) and 
Attanasio et al. (2008) it is argued that the impact of Oportunidades and the 
competitiveness outcomes are higher for older beneficiaries. Regarding this 
modification, it is reduced the sample including child/youth between 10-20 
years, which account for 10,397 individuals, see Appendix. 
 
It is observed in Table A.1 that the ATT increases importantly, being in the 
order of 4.1 percentage points in the baseline estimations. With respect to the 
control variables, the age impact almost duplicates, meaning that if a poor 
boy/girl in the sample has between 10-20 years, it is more plausible that 
he/she would drop out from school. Moreover, head’s of family education 
becomes a more important determinant on enrolment decisions, representing 
a positive effect for this outcome. Finally, the sex coefficient is on the 
average the same as for the whole sample (children 6-20 years) predicting a 
negative effect on attendance if the children is a boy. 
 
Once again, the effect of the general competitiveness outcome is not robust 
for either of both years of analysis. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that 
the impact of living in a state with middle inclusive, educated and healthy 
society (IEHS) rises considerably. For instance, if a child in a beneficiary 
household lives in a region with middle IEHS, the enrolment rate increases 
by 7.9 percentage points in the first year of evaluation. Furthermore, the 
coefficient is higher for the second year’s baseline estimation (8.5%). The 
latter variables remain strongly significant even after the addition of the rest 
of the covariates, see Table A.2. 
 
The very first estimations for the sub-index of Competitive Economics 
Sectors (CES) also show an increment for the middle group. If treated 
children live in a state with middle CES, their school attendance raises by 
6.5%. For the second year calculations, the middle CES coefficient falls to 
5.5 percentage points, remaining statistically significant though, see Table 
A.3.  
 
The Oportunidades effect on school attendance rises importantly when is 
launched in a state with a highly efficient and efficacious government 
(EEG). In Table A.4 is shown that the coefficients for this variable rose 8.2 
and 8.1 percentage points in the first and second year calculations, 
respectively. It is worth mentioning that for that group of age (10-20 years) 
the effect of living in a state with middle EEG is positive and lower in 
magnitude than the high one (3.6%) revealing substantial gains relatively to 
the group of people living in regions with low EEG. The latter coefficients Ensayos Revista de Economía 
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decrease in magnitude after adding the control variables but are still 
significant though. 
 
The results found for the selected competitiveness outcomes are remarkable. 
As a matter of fact, they are comparable with the ones found in Attanasio et 
al. (2003) for the rural areas, whom estimated an impact on school 
attendance of 7.4 percentage points for the group of more dynamic states, 
and 2.3 percentage points for the group of poorest states, being the difference 
between these two groups statistically significant. 
 
4.6 Additional Controls 
 
If the effect of inclusive, educated and healthy society, economic sectors 
competitiveness and government efficiency is valid, after including 
additional control variables
12 the effect should have to remain statistically 
significant. It is argued that the following variables have a significant effect 
on enrolment rates: household income, household size, number of children 
under 16 years of age and the dependency ratio. All the latter variables 
resulted significant explanatory variables of enrolment rates. However, the 
household income impact is infinitesimal, given that all the families in the 
sample were deemed classified as poor so that their incomes are very similar. 
On the other hand, it is found that if the household size increases by one 
more family member, the enrolment rate reduces by 1.8 percentage points, 
whereas if the additional member is under 16 years of age, there is an 
increment of 1.5 percentage points. Moreover, if the dependency ratio in the 
household increases 1 unit, the enrolment rate rises by 6.5 percentage points. 






When policy makers attempt to implement a social intervention, information 
regarding a given objective group is worthwhile by its own. In this regard, it 
was proved that the prevailing context in Mexican states with highly 
efficient and efficacious governments, middle competitive economic sectors 
and middle inclusive, educated and healthy society, allow Oportunidades to 
achieve higher impacts on enrolment rates. Furthermore, it was confirmed 
that these effects are significantly improved if it is considered the impact on 
older children.  
 
                                                 
12 The tables of this subsection are available on request. Does the Impact of Oportunidades Program Increases in Highly Competitive…? 
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When institutions work efficiently the environment to implement social 
interventions is more favourable. Consequently, such a social policy should 
have to be accompanied by mechanisms of co-responsibility between 
policymakers and other institutions like the Ministry for Education and local 
government organisms. Behrman et al. (2005) have suggested that 
Oportunidades may have actually lowered school quality, given the 
increased number of students derived from the program support, and the 
“congestion effect” caused by it. Moreover, Attanasio et al. (2003) posit that 
additional policy interventions are necessary in relatively poorer areas in 
order to achieve comparative program results as in slightly more dynamic 
regions. 
 
The findings reveal that children living in beneficiary households have more 
economic incentives to attend school if they feel relatively less 
disadvantaged with respect to the rest of the population. This means that 
beneficiaries will attend school if the expected benefits that they will obtain 
from participating in the program (e.g. grants, health services, higher returns 
to education) do compensate the expected costs of attending school (e.g. 
forgone income from working, schooling costs, future costs of job search).  
 
In the same line, results predict that children may consider not enrolling at 
school if they judge that future costs of meeting enterprises job requirements 
are high enough.  Hence, living in a state with middle competitive economic 
sectors reduces participants expected costs (increases the expected utility) of 
applying for a job in the future, encouraging them to carry on further years 
of schooling. 
 
The competitiveness level impact resulted positive but is not robust. The 
latter finding would be caused by the high level of aggregation of the data. 
Specifically, the SCI2006 includes variables that would affect the impact of 
Oportunidades, whereas is not feasible that variables like the environmental 
ones can help the program performance. Furthermore, the sampled states in 
the ENCELURB are not ranked among the most competitive ones. 
Nowadays, Oportunidades supports children in states with the highest levels 
of competitiveness and, as a result, having access to this data would lead us 
to more robust results. 
 
Finally, as it was previously discussed, there are important pre-program 
differences between treatment and control groups. In order to tackle with this 
methodological issue, a more suitable model may be a difference-in-
difference model with matching. In this model it was weighted the control 
group with a propensity score, which measures the probability of 
participation given some baseline characteristics at the family and/or 
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Estimated program effect on enrolment  
Child/Youth 10-20 years old 
Competitiveness Index 
 
   Estimator 
Variable  1 Year DID  2 Year DID 
   (1)    (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6) 
Treated    0.041***   0.041***   0.032***   0.048***   0.047***   0.053*** 
   (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
  
Highly  
Competitive   …  -0.053***  -0.055***  …  -0.053***  -0.058*** 
States Dummy   (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.013) 
    
Middle  
Competitive   …  -0.030***  -0.064***  …  -0.029***  -0.057*** 
States Dummy     (0.009)  (0.008)    (0.009)  (0.008) 
    
Treatment on 
Highly  …   0.018*   0.001  …   0.021   0.005 
Competitive States    (0.023)  (0.020)    (0.024)  (0.020) 
  
Treatment on 
Middle   …   0.005   0.021  …   0.002   0.024 
Competitive States    (0.018)  (0.015)    (0.020)  (0.018) 
  
Age  …  …  -0.084***  …  …  -0.084*** 
       (0.001)      (0.001) 
  
Sex  …  …  -0.011*  …  …  -0.012** 
       (0.006)      (0.006) 
  
Head of Family’s 
Education  …  …   0.014***  …  …   0.015*** 
       (0.001)       (0.001) 
Number of 
Observations  17,825  17,825  13,164  16,872  16,872  12,935 
R
2  0.0070  0.0084  0.3477  0.0155  0.0169  0.3359 
Note: The dummy and treatment variables are correlated by construction, however, to show the general effect of living in each 
region and being treated separately.  
Bootstrap Standard Errors in Parentheses, 500 replications. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 













Estimated program effect on enrolment  
Child/Youth 10-20 years old 
Sub-Index: Inclusive, Educated and Healthy Society (IEHS) 
 
   Estimator 
Variable  1 Year DID  2 Year DID 
      (1)    (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6) 
Treated    0.041***  0.041***   0.033***   0.048***   0.047***   0.053*** 
   (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.012) 
  
Highly IEHS  …  -0.017*  -0.060***  …  -0.022**  -0.060*** 
States Dummy   (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.009) 
  
Middle IEHS  …  -0.036***  -0.077***  …  -0.042***  -0.076*** 
States Dummy   (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.010) 
  
Treatment on 
Highly   …  -0.004   0.024*  …   0.003   0.028* 
IEHS States  (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.017)  (0.015) 
  
Treatment on 
Middle   …   0.079***   0.069***  …   0.085***   0.067*** 
IEHS States  (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.019) 
  
Age  …  …  -0.084***  …  …  -0.084*** 
   (0.001)  (0.001) 
  
Sex  …  …  -0.011**  …  …  -0.012** 
    (0.005)  (0.006) 
Head of 
Family´s 
Education  …  …   0.014***  …  …   0.015*** 
    (0.001)  (0.001) 
Number of 
Observations  17,825  17,825  13,164  16,872  16,872  12,935 
R
2  0.0070  0.0082  0.3477  0.0155  0.0169  0.3362 
Note: The dummy and treatment variables are correlated by construction, however, to show the general effect of living in each 
region and being treated separately.  
Bootstrap Standard Errors in Parentheses, 500 replications. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 




















Estimated program effect on enrolment  
Child/Youth 10-20 years old 
Sub-Index: Competitive Economic Sectors (CES) 
 
   Estimator 
Variable  1 Year DID  2 Year DID 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Treated    0.041***    0.041***    0.032***   0.048***   0.048***   0.053*** 
   (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.013) 
  
Highly CES  …  -0.035***  -0.053***  …  -0.033***  -0.049*** 
States Dummy   (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.009) 
  
Middle CES  …  -0.070***  -0.063***  …  -0.062***  -0.055*** 
States Dummy   (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.010) 
  
Treatment on Highly  …    0.007    0.013  …    0.005   0.011 
CES States  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.016) 
  
Treatment on Middle   …   0.065***   0.055***  …   0.055***   0.041*** 
CES States  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.014) 
  
Age  …  …  -0.084***  …  …  -0.084*** 
   (0.001)  (0.001) 
  
Sex  …  …  -0.010*  …  …  -0.012** 
   (0.006)  (0.006) 
Head of Family’s 
Education  …  …   0.014***  …  …   0.015*** 
   (0.001)  (0.001) 
  
Number of 
Observations  17,825  17,825  13,164  16,872  16,872  12,935 
R
2  0.0070  0.0097  0.3464  0.0155  0.0175  0.3348 
Note: The dummy and treatment variables are correlated by construction, however, to show the general effect of living in each 
region and being treated separately.  
Bootstrap Standard Errors in Parentheses, 500 replications. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 






















Estimated program effect on enrolment  
Child/Youth 10-20 years old 
Sub-Index: Efficient and Eficacious Government (EEG) 
 
   Estimator 
Variable  1 Year DID  2 Year DID 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Treated   0.041***   0.041***   0.033***   0.048***   0.048***   0.054*** 
   (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.012) 
  
Highly EEG  …  -0.072***  -0.045***  …  -0.061***  -0.036*** 
States Dummy   (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.011) 
  
Middle EEG  …  -0.018*  -0.031***  …  -0.019*  -0.031*** 
States Dummy   (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.009) 
  
Treatment on 
Highly  …   0.082***   0.050***  …   0.081**   0.046*** 
EEG States  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.015) 
  
Treatment on 
Middle   …   0.036**  0.038**  …  0.046  0.049*** 
EEG States  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.015) 
  
Age  …  …  -0.083***  …  …  -0.084*** 
   (0.001)  (0.001) 
  
Sex  …  …  -0.009*  …  …  -0.011* 
   (0.006)  (0.006) 
  
Head of Family’s 
Education  …  …   0.014***  …  …   0.015*** 
   (0.001)  (0.001) 
Number of 
Observations  17,825  17,825  13,164  16,872  16,872  12,935 
R
2  0.0070  0.0098  0.3443  0.0155  0.0176  0.3332 
Note: The dummy and treatment variables are correlated by construction, however, to show the general effect of living in each 
region and being treated separately.  
Bootstrap Standard Errors in Parentheses, 500 replications. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
Source: Own elaboration with data from the ENCELURB, www.oportunidades.gob.mx.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 